If we were to draw a world map of organizations, not only would we notice the extent to which organizations have spread throughout the world over the past few decades; a closer analysis would also attract attention to the striking similarity between organizations in different parts of the world. Neo-institutionalism acknowledges the fact that there is a difference between the front stages of organizations, which are becoming increasingly similar throughout the world, and the "work activities" taking place on the backstage. A "decouplmg," according to
The Diffusion of Organizations 259 accepted formal structures while permitting their activities to be oriented toward practicai aspects. While the neo-institutionalist term of "decoupling" makes an important point, we cannot help noticing that the theoretical formulation of concrete "work activities" remains rather weak. In neo-institutionalism, the phenomenon of informality is relegated to somewhere below the radar of theory and can no langer be captured with its own conceptual language (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 34l) .1 Systems theory, äs weil, regards organizations äs a central phenomenon of modern soclety. The career of the functional System äs a primary unit of differentiation of modern society is accompanied by the development of formal organizations. In its most extreme form, this idea boils down to the thesis that a functionally differentiated society must also be a society of organizations. However, in this general form, the argument is ill-equipped to explain the rapid spread of organizations around the world. While linking functional differentiation and the rise of organizations may be an accurate account of the historical development of Western countries, assuming that the rest of the world will simply follow Western patterns would be a relapse to the fallacies of modernization theory, with its basicaily teleological outlook. Indeed, it can be argued that Systems theory-even more than neo-institutionalism-has been blind to the functioning of organizations in developing countries and to the interface between organizations in industrialized and developing countries (for the only exception, see Luhmann 1995: 18ff.). Its concept of society and of organizations often seems to be built on the model of OECD countries in the 1980s, while the Situation in developmg countries is either ignored altogether or dealt with äs a side issue. The question Systems theory has to ask itself is how it can fulfill its claim of being a "radically anti-regionalist theory of society" (Luhmann 1997: 35) .
I propose that we can advance our theoretical understanding by finetuning our use of systems-theoretical approach. Organizations form neither simply äs an enactment of globally diffused models nor äs a logical consequence of functional differentiation. Instead, a major mechanism of the formation or organizations is the prior existence of organfzations, because organizations prefer to deal with other organizations in their environments.
I call this the dynamics of "contact infection": Where organizations operate, more organizations are likely to be formed. This approach is based on Systems theory but elaborates on its conceptualization of the role of organizations in global processes. The most basic notion of Systems theory is the pertinence of boundaries-in particular, boundaries between Systems and environments. Contrary to neoinstitutionalism, Systems theory does not assume social reality to be an "open space" through which cultural or other prescriptions flow freely and without resistance. In this vein, I propose to conceptualize the spread of organizations not in terms of a unitary, globally established culture, but in terms of the processes that take place at the boundaries between systemsin this case, organizations-and their environments.
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In this chapter, I focus on foreign aid organizations, which are major agents in the global spread of organizations. Foreign aid organizations are not the only organizations involved in the global spread of organizations, to be sure, but they are a key factor and, to say the least, an instructive exemplary case. This is so for three reasons: First, foreign aid organizations are permanently situated at the interface between industrialized and developing countries. Second, they are more committed than any other type of organization to promoting world society. Third, they deal reflexively with the subject of organization, since aid organizations typically regard themselves äs specialists in the analysis of other organizations-that is to say, their "partner organizations" in the Third World.
In Section 2 of this chapter, I give a condensed historical account of the formation of organizations in peripheral parts of the world and show that it operates increasingly via the mechanism of "contact infection," instead of "brauch establishment." In Section 3, I discuss the work of foreign aid organizations and their stance toward the issue of organization-buildmg, which was at first a side effect of developmental projects and later came to be a manifest or key aspect of developmental work. However, this means that organizations in developing countries are usually not simple copies of Western organizations, because they have specifically adapted to the needs of processing foreign aid. In Section 4, I analyze typical differences between organizations in Western and in developing countries by drawing on and elaborating the systems-theoretical notion of informality in organizations. Foreign aid is a typical field in which organizations with different types of informality-which I call "informality I" and "informality II"-come in contact with each other.
THE EXPANSION OF ORGANIZATIONS: FROM BRANCH ESTABLISHMENT TO CONTACT ESTABLISHMENT
Attempts at capturing historical developments of societies on maps have so far concentrated primarily on the presentation of states, religions and eco" nomic processes. Historical maps almost exclusively show the appearance (and disappearance) of states, the dissemination of world religions, and the expansion of economic centers of production and trading processes. The scheme of Order of historical atlases seems to be oriented toward functional Systems and evinces a clear preference for the societal domains of politics, religion and the economy.
What would a historical world atlas of organizations look like? In my opinion, the system ofmaps would not begin until the 14th or 15th century, when a small number of maps would have been sufficient. The maps of the 19th century would be more comprehensive and would depict processes such äs the diffusion of the Humboldt-based university model to North America or the diffusion of certain industrial processes of production. The
The Diffusion of Örganizations 261 maps of the 20th century would probably show an almost explosive increase in the structuring pattern of the organization.
A look at the new organizations established would suffice to illustrate that the number of organizadons has increased disproportionately at the municipal, national and international levels when compared with indicators such äs population and economic growth (for international NGOs, see Boli and Thomas 1997: 171ff.; 1999: 13ff.) .
Organizadons have asserted themselves äs a dominant social form in a growing number of social fields. While organlzations were originally confined to the domains ofreligion (e.g., churches) and government (e.g., public administration authorities), they are now ever-present in education, science, Sport, tourism and the economy (Meyer 2002) . A number of different terms were used to capture this expansion of organizations in the 19th and 20th
centuries-e.g., "organizational revolution" (Boulding 1953) , "development of managerialism" (Considine and Painter 1998) and "society of organizations" (Perrow 1987 ).
The Diffusion of Organization Through the

Creadon of Branches
The formation of organizadons dates back to early Christianity. At the moment when the early Christian church became a reiigious association whose members were recruited without regard to ascriptive criteria such äs family origin, social class or ethnic group^ the first signs of modern organization were discernible (Parsons 1964: 347ff.) . When politics and law separated from religion and-even more importantly-the latter separated from the context of sodety äs a whole in late 17th century England, organizations also developed in these areas that were able to decide membership issues with an increasing extent of autonomy. With the advent of industrialization, labor differentiated itself to assume a specific role freed from other demands.
People no longer worked primarily at home with their families; instead, the members of a family separately worked in different Jobs (Parsons 1971) .
How did the structuring pattern of organization spread throughout the world in this phase? The mechanism that contributed in particular to the expansion of organizations can be described äs "branch establishment."
We can observe the prototypical mechanism of "branch establishment" in religious organizations. By forming sub-units, churches and convents not only spread their religious mfluence but also contributed substantially to the expansion of a specific type of organization. While this process was initially confined to Europe, it spread to America, Asia and Africa once these continents were "discovered." The Jesuits are just one example of an organizadon that-in just a few decades-founded hundreds of new Orders in Latin America, Asia and Africa (Stichweh 2001:2) .
Another process of "branch establishment" is exemplified by the trade cooperations that developed in the 16th and 17th century and showed many 262 Stefan Kühl hallmarks of modern organizations. As the greatest profits could be made in long-distance trade, trade cooperations often established branch offices in America, Asia and Africa, which were protected by military means. Unlike in Uth-or 15th-century Venice, for instance, when merchants merely sent trustworthy relatives abroad, large trade cooperations such äs the Hudson Bay Company, the Royal African Company,, the British East India Company and the Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie were founded, which had a great number of brauch offices at their disposal and were thus able to disseminate the pattern of orgamzation.
The expansion of colonization also resulted in a surge in the number of "political branches" established in America, Asia and Africa. In addition, the growing regional expansion of the colonial powers rendered the administrative structure more Professional. Prior to the begmning of World War I, Europe held some 85 percent of the earth äs colonies, protectorates, dependencies, dominions and commonwealths, äs compared with a mere 35 percent in 1800. By 1878, the proportion held was 67 percent (McNeill 1984: 29ff.) . The colonies were increasingly ruled by administrative authorities who regarded themselves äs Instruments of the controlling nation.
The societal formations that the colonial powers encountered had a major influence on the process of organizational diffusion triggered by colonialism. When taking possession of Australia, Central Africa or the Islands of Central America, branch establishments met with "primitive" or "advanced primitive societies," to use the terms of Talcott Parsons (1966) . When expanding to China, India or the Islamic empires, branches of the colonial powers encountered societal formations that not only had developed a high degree of societal complexity but also showed signs ofhaving formed organizations oftheir own.
In this early period, branches dealt not only with other organizations but also with tribes and other social entities. As long äs the profit strategies of companies were based on purchasing products at a good price, it did not make any difference whether these products were supplied by tribes, kingdoms, individual traders or other enterprises. What counted was achieving a maximum margin between purchase price and sales price.
Political branches, too, established sub-units. However, these sub-units were not intended to facilitate a further expansion of the principle of organization but rather reflected the idea that one should fall back on the principle of "indirect rule" in order to secure the colonies. "Indirect rule" regarded "native institutions" äs an "integral part of the administrative machinery" (Lugard 1965: 207) and advocated the "employment of the existing institutions of the country for all possible purposes to which they are adequate," according to Julian Huxley (1931: 103) .
The Dlffusion of Organization by "Contact Infection"
With the end of colonialism, branch establishment with respect to organizations lost its central importance but did not disappear altogethen When Tbe Diffusion of örganizations 263 decolonization started at the end of World War U, administration authorities, armies, universities, schools, legal institutions and religious organizations could no longer be seen äs branches ofWestern master organizations.
But how did it come about at that time that organizations strongly resembling those of the former mother countries were developing in the newly founded nadon-states? The explanadon offered by neo-institutionalism is that the principles of the "world polity" subjected the newly established nation-states in Ladn America, Africa and Asia to a comprehensive standardization, and the nation-states could obtain legltimacy only by forming democratic parties, bureaucradc admmistration authorities, armies, universities and schools based on accepted cultural blueprints (Meyer 1992: 265ff.) . While there is much to be said in favor of this explanation, it does not explain how this process proceeded in detail. My argument is that organizations came into being in the recently founded states because the organizations in the former mother countries could communicate only with entities similar to themselves. This process of organization formation can be described äs "contact infecdon."
The process of contact infecuon can be clearly seen in social science research on management modes (see also Strang and Meyer 1993) . Organizational research has meanwhile acquired a good understanding of the way in which ideas, techniques and practices diffuse among organizations. Studies on the dissemination of ISO Standards, the concept of lean management or the concept of "capacity building" widely known in foreign aid were able to show the speed at which new concepts of "good management" spread in an organizational field. Also, there are fairly clear hypotheses about the role of "institutional entrepreneurs" such äs management consultants or experts from science in this process of infecdon (DiMaggio 1988). However, in its focus on management modes, organizational research has overlooked the fact that it is already the basic process of organization formation that very frequently takes place through contact infection. Organizations develop because organizations can best communicate with other organizations.
The development of public administration authorities m developing countries is an example of this kind of contact infection. The principle of public administration previous to the colonialization had been unknown especially in Africa, but also in some Asian countries. In many countries, the rudiments of an independent administradon did not develop until the final years of colonial rule. While the Standard explanation of this phenomenon maintains that public administration authorities emerged in developing countries because they were the most efficient mechanism of government, there is a lot to be said in favor of the argument that public administration authorities were formed because they represented the only adequate points of contact for Westem organizations.
Research mainly focuses on transnational enterprises operating branches in developing countries (Herkenrath and Bornschier 2003) but tends to overlook a process of organization formation that is growing in importance.
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The increasing exclusion of value-adding processes from large corporations resulted in a Situation in which suppliers had to provide these processes.
These suppliers probably established themselves äs such not only because being an enterprise is the most efficient form of value-adding, but also because enterprises can best communicate with other enterprises (regarding China, see Tsai 2003) .
The phenomenon of contact infection also provides at least a partial explanation of the explosive increase in the number of NGOs in the 20th century. It is difficult both for Western and for Southern organizations to communicate with amorphous creations such äs the "target group of impoverished women" and the "Landless Movement," to say nothing of "civil society." For this reason, the development of NGOs should be seen not only äs a "grassroots" organizational phenomenon but also äs a process of organization formation that resulted from the "demand" of existing organizations for associations capable of acting.
According to Bronislaw Malinowski, contact infection should not be pictured äs a passive process in which a virus descends upon a social creation; contact infection takes place through a process of active acquisition. An idea, form of work or technique must be taken up actively by the participants, äs Malinowski pointed out in the diffusion controversy: there was no other way in which an idea could diffuse in a social System (Malinowski 1927 ).
In addition, I contend that organizations that develop through contact infection permit organizational patterns to show a higher degree of variability and especially a more rapid variability than organizations whose formation is attributable to the creation of branches. Branches often maintam the structure of their mother organization. In many cases, the "command center" continues to control the branch for an extended period of time and impedes the formation of unique patterns of organization. Variations develop at a rather slow pace, äs we can see in the examples of religious Orders splitting away from the original Institution or branches of an enterprise becoming independent. In the case of organizations developing through contact infection, on the other hand, a higher degree of variability occurs already in the process of acquisition.
THE PRODUCTION OF ORGANIZATIONS AS THE RESULT OF FOREIGN AID
In an instructive thought experiment, John W. Meyer, John Boli, George M.
Thomas and Francisco 0. Ramirez contend that, if a previously unknown Island society were discovered, it would soon establish itself äs a nationstate, which would then be recognized by other states and join the UN.
The Island would regard itself äs a national economy and adopt international trade arrangements and globally standardized calculation procedures.
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Organizations oriented toward organizations m other nation-states would develop in areas such äs politics^ the economy, educadon, science and medical care. The Island inhabitants would become citizens with individual civil rights (Meyer et ai. 1997: 145ff.) .
Meyer et ai. also note that international aid organizations would soon
show an interest in the Island society and offer "development cooperation."
Training courses on the Island or abroad would give the elites of the Island an opportunity to get to know opportunities for reform, and advisers would support their endeavors to implement reform projects. Furthermore, internationally proven evaluation measures would be made available to assess the efficiency ofreforms (Meyer 1997: 164f.) . We can elaborate on this idea by looking at the history of foreign aid organizations and identifying patterns in their stance on the issue of organization-building in the target countries.
The Product of Foreign Aid: Organizadons
The most important aid organizations in the first few decades after World War II presumed that their work primarily consisted of major education and Information campaigns; the creation of a modern infrastructure; literacy programs; family planning programs; the construction of embankments, power stations, highways, railways and bridges; the construction of waterworks, sewage plants and plumbing installations; the construction of large, readyfor-occupancy facilities such äs cement plants, hospitals, schools, hotels, sea ports and airports; the creation of health centers and livestock breeding farms in rural areas; assistance with the development and extraction of min" eral resources and the provision of seeds and agricultural expertise.
Besides the Information and education programs and the infrastructure measures cast in concrete and steel, foreign aid also produced organizations.
Apart from the branches established by colonial administration, numerous modern types of organizations have developed in Asia, Africa and Latin America since decolonization. In many countries, decolonization gave rise to an independent legal System with autonomous courts of justice, public prosecutors and large law offices. Many developing countries also built their own umversities, research Institutes and political organizadons (mimstries) after the demise of the former colonial power.
In the early phase of foreign aid, the major aid organizations tended to We cannot help noticing that administration authorlties in developing countries did not simply copy the structure ofpublic administration in industrialized countries-in particular, in the first decades of their existence. The mission of developmental administration was not confined to implementing national political guidelmes; developmental administration was to be the means by which an "enlightened minority" would transform local society into a modern state (Turner and Hulme 1997: 12f.) . Also, government plans were to be implemented with the aid of developmental administration in order to achieve the development aims laid down in cooperation with the major aid organizations (Riggs 1970: 6f.) . A look at the ministerial and administrative structures of developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin
America shows that-contrary to what neo-institutionalists beUeve-these
were not exact copies of the respective agendes in industrialized countries.
They differed from their Western counterparts in that they had established ministries of planning and special authorities of developmental administration äs central points of contact for the aid organizations.
The different role of the ministry of finance in industrialized countries vs. in developing countries is another example. In industrialized nations, the primary task of the ministry of finance is to implement tax legislation and allocate tax revenue to the different specialized mmistries. Specialized ministries such äs the ministry of education and the ministry of agriculture are in charge, overall, with respect to the contents of such functlons. The ministry of finance has considerable bearing on the specialized ministries.
Although the structural adjustment policy prescribed by the IMF and the World Bank called for the withdrawal of governments from active development policy, the international and national aid organizations continued to be in need of functioning channels through which their development funds could be expended. Consequently, äs a result of activities of the World Bank or national aid organizations, the ministry of finance assumed a powerful coordinating role in many developing countries that extended to the special areas belonging to specialized ministries, such äs the ministry of education or the ministry of infrastructure (Mkandawire 2003: 19) . The Diffusion of Organizations 169 enforcement of its formal order and the effective forestallment of deviant or "illegal" acts would run into significant problems of adaptation. The orga" nization would find it hard to adapt to a changing environment that eludes its control and to handle the contradictory demands placed on it. Thus, the survival of the organization requires "an order to be established that is relatively independent of the formal organization" (Luhmann 1964: 304f.) . This informal order will be used to solve problems that cannot be addressed by formal means but are crucial to the success of the organization.
The two sets of order differ in thaf compliance with formal demands can be enforced by invoking the rule of membership: Anybody who is caught in violation of formal demands jeopardizes his or her membership status (Kühl 2013: 94ff.) , and thus members must continually consider the question "Gan I remain a member if I openly reject this or that unreasonable demand?" (Luhmann 1964: 40) . On the other hand, informal expectations are not äs clear-cut and subject to straightforward enforcement, and they must rely on informal sanctions äs a response to violations. In the event of conflict, organizations should ensure that their own actions are in agreement with the formal structure. Anyone acting in obvious violation of the formal structure of an organization risks being out on a limb in an escalating conflict (Luhmann 1964: 69; see also Kühl 2013: 115) . Rather, hlat networks aimed at getdng hold of raw materials, machines and spare parts that were indispensable to achieving the targets and Standards of a planned economy but unobtainable by formal means (Berliner 1957: 324ff.}.
Luhmann points out that life in organizations is characterized by a permanent switch between formality and informality: People think about whether to personally and immediately take note of a piece of Information fact depends less on maximum profits and more on what Meyer and Rowan call "institutional legitimacy"-successful adaptation to the institutionalized expectations of their environment, which is made up of ministerial bureaucracy, the media and action groups of development policy (Luhmann 1964: 119; Meyer and Rowan 1977: 341) . The Balance between offlcial goals and the accommodation of changing institutional demands must to a large degree be accomplished by informal means. As Luhmann notes, creating the impression that a bank is "trusrworthy," that an authority has a "sense of the law" and-in the same vein-that a foreign aid organization delivers sustainable efficiency requires a high degree of "tactful cooperadon on behalf of the overall picture; while formal expectations have given an outline to this picture, they do not suffice on their own to turn it into a reality" (Luhmann 1964: 122) . Organizations situated in this way come dose to the ideal of a "hypocritical sanctimonious organization" (Brunsson 1989: 29ff.) .
Apart from this well-known "Informality I," there is a second type of informality, which is particularly conspicuous in organizations of developmg countnes.
"Informality II": Informality äs Incomplete Boundary Maintenance
The worldwide "success story" of organizations is built on the principle of role separation (which, although it predominates in modern society, was uncommon in earlier societies). An individual's role äs a member of an organization is institutionally separate from all other roles the member may perform. According to Luhmann, this means that a status from outside the organization cannot simply be transferred to the organization: "Fathers, first-born children, home-owners or centers-forward do not enjoy Privileges in the organization on account of this external status although a high status in the outside world may weil bestow prestlge, connections and influence on a person" (Luhmann 1964: 65) . At the same time., role separation enables members to "reject inappropriate demands" (ibid.). Upon joming an organization, the member is required to abstract from personal obligations he or she may have in other roles or contexts outside the organization, and he or she can reject demands made on him or her "at work when [he or she] is approached äs a relative, a lodge [member], a party member or a holiday acquaintance" (ibid.).
Unless role expectations made on the members of an organization are separated from personal expectations addressed to them, an organization cannot be an autonomous social System in its own right, a "legal entity."
It is the issue of boundary mamtenance that is at stake here: The organization must ensure (a) that members' actions are seen äs representing the organization and are not perceived äs personal acts of individuals and (b) that commitments taken on by the organization will hold, even upon The Diffusion of Örganizations 271 the death or retirement of the member who originally signed them (Luhmann 1984: 430f.) .
From this angle, the hallmark of many organizadons in developing countries is the insufficient dissociation of formal membership from other roles, leading to the dominance of informal over formal commitments.2 For instance, in many cases communication takes place not through the official channels laid down in the orgamzational chart but through networks of family, ethrüc groups or friends. Of course, similar processes can also be detected in Western organizations (Dalton 1959) . However, in cases of conflict, Western organizations usually stick to formally prescribed channels of communicadon and decision making rather than to informal channels, and members who have shown a preference for informal byways are expected to declare their adherence to the formal structure of the organization. In developing countries, informal channels prevail in many cases-, and there is a much more relaxed attitude toward the primacy of official channels and competencies, resulting in a kind of "topsy-turvy world" based on "unbounded" instead of "contained" informaUty (Hölzer 2006: 271; Chap- of the week, although there may be an unwritten law that he should work at least three days a week. In rural areas of West Africa, a teacher may not be in the classroom during lessons, but he or she will adhere to the informal rule that the pupils must be given assignments during the teacher's absence to keep them busy.
Social science literature has called this phenomenon "competing informal Institution" or "conflicting informal Institution" (Lauth 2000: 25; Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 728f.) . In competing informal insritutions, the formal rules of an organization are enforced only to a very limited extent, so that the members of the organization can pursue their own objectives, which may be incompadble with those of the organization. The demands made by persons outside the organization (e.g., relatives, friends, or members of 272 Stefan Kühl other organizations) outweigh those of the organization and may result in corruption, personal gain or patronage.
Such informal network structures cut across and thwart organizational structures, and often come dose to outright corruption. Different parts of the world have different terms for them. In the Middle East, the term wasta is used to describe networks and favors among relatives, friends and acquaintances. Involvement in wasta is taken for granted, and those engaging in it make sure that the "wasta account" of the participants is balanced in the long term and that favors granted by strangers are pald for in kind (Cunningham and Sarayrah 1993) . In Central and South America, this principle is called confianza and is used to describe relations of trust in which an informally provided Service is not paid for immediately (because that would be tantamount to bribery) but compensated for in the long term (Lomnitz 1988) . In China, guanxi denotes networks of individuals established over langer periods of time, of which people avail themselves to obtain Services or products (Yang 1989; Guthrie 1998) . In Sub-Saharan Africa, a specific combination of patronage networks and government-controlled organizations emerged after decolonization. Elbaki Hermassi expressed in slightly exaggerated terms that "putting society under state control" led to a "privatization of the state." Greater state control, according to Hermassi, did not strengthen public resources, but rather consolidated networks providing profitable sources of income (quoted in Lemarchand 1988: 156) . continue to be a member of the organization (Rottenburg 2002: 4l) . The problem is that organizations in which membership is subject to very little or no autonomous control have to accept a loss of control capacity. Organizations' autonomy hinges on their ability to formalize behavloral expectations and tie them to the question of membership. If they fail to establish this connection, they fall prey to external, uncontrollable forces and practices. The Diffusion of Örganizaüons 273 aimed at implementing projects precipitated by needs that local authorities have identified. However, this relation is often unofficially reversed, and projects basically follow the rules and Standards established by Western foreign aid organizations. Furthermore, according to the official script of development cooperation, consulting firms usually act äs contractors of the receiving organizations in the South. However, the informal script often has it that consuldng firms are treated äs recipients of instructions from Western aid organizations (Rottenburg 2002: 214ff.) .
Informality Between Organizadons
These informal scripts and informal reversions may introduce considerable distortions and complicacies for participating organizations. However, due to their informal nature, these problems cannot be addressed openly in negotiations, and neither Western foreign aid organizations nor receivinô rganizations in the developing countries can systematically reflect them in their negotiation strategies. This is because whenever arduous issues are addressed, either party can invoke the official script, thereby discrediting informal pracdces and connected problems äs unacceptable deviations from the rules and regulations. Discussion of informal processes can take place only in the protected space within an organization, and even then any participant can halt the discussion at any time by invoking official regulations.
As a result of these difficulties, foreign aid organizations-quite in contrast to their self-portrayals-should be seen not äs learning organizations but äs organizations wkh a pronounced resistance to learning (Kühl 2009 ).
Between (on the one hand) pressure to maintam the fa^ade of an organization that adheres to the rules and (on the other hand) pressure to maintain the necessary informal practices, a vacuum develops that impedes learning and rational reaction to crucial problems.
The preceding discussion of different forms of informality in and between organizations shows the usefulness of a systems-theoretical approach to organizations and their global expansion. The analytical Instruments that Systems theory öfters are more refined than the neo-institutionalist concept of decoupling. Neo-institutionalists do emphasize that formal structures and actual activities diverge, but this divergence is taken to be a more or less universal feature of organizations äs well äs of states. Decoupling is assumed to be more pronounced in developing countries, which may lack the resources to adjust their real, day-to-day activities to conform to formally prescribed models, and which may be forced to adopt models that originated in other places and other social contexts. But the difference between organizations in Western countries and developing countries is seen äs a mere difference in degree-äs strong or not-so-strong decoupling.
Systems theory, on the other hand, conceptualizes the difference between typical styles of informality in Western and non-Western organizations äs a qualitative difference: äs the difference between supplementing vs. competing informal structures, or äs informality precipitated by the non-formalizable needs of the organization vs. by openness for and defenselessness against demands from other, non-organizational contexts. Weber (1976) , same scholars have attempted to gain a deeper understanding of modern society through an analysis of organizations. However, this "return of society" means that the term "organization" is becoming increasingly indistinct. This is evident in the debates about the "dissolution of enterprise" and the "erosion ofboundaries between inside and outside," in which the subject of organization research seems to just melt away.
W. Richard Scott, James March and Johan Olsen, all of whom originally started out äs organization theorists, clearly belong to those who promote the dissolution of the concept of organization into concepts such äs institution or network (Scott 1987, March and Olsen 1989) . Similarly, the concept of <(world culture" seems to be increasingly indifferent to whether this world culture is enacted by individuals, organizations or states, and organizations are increasingly portrayed äs mere "franchises" ofworld culture or of "subsystems" of society. The erosion of the term "organization" is reflected in the use of the term "informality." Discussion of "informal sectors" (Castells and Portes 1989) and "informal institutions" (North 1990) increasingly omits the transition from the analysis of organizations to the analysis of society. Especially in political science, but also in sociology, The Diffusion of Organizations 175
Modernization theory was predicated on the assumption that these "blurred" and only partially delimited organizations in developing countries were bound to become decent organizations with well-established boundaries, mirroring their models in the West. This hope has been dashed for the most part after five decades of experience with foreign aid. We can safely assume that organizations in developing countries will remain distinct and require different descriptive formulae compared to organizations in industrialized countries.
We need an analytical approach that is equipped to describe the differences between those types of organizations and does not assume the unilateral diffusion of Western-type organizations to developing countries.
Then we can ask the further question of what happens at the contact points between organizations of the West and of the South. The issue of whether we are witnessing a "Westernization of the South" (Sachs 1992) or a "Brazilianization of the West" (Beck 1999 ) in the long run will be decided at least in part by processes taking place at these contact points. 
